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A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: The Unilateral Executive and
the Separation of Powers
THOMAS J. CLEARY*
“Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are, and
those few will not dare to oppose themselves to the many, who have the
majesty of the state to defend them.”1
–Niccolò Machiavelli
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution vests all executive powers in a president.2 This is the unitary executive theory. By virtue of this, many believe
the president is vested with the power to act unilaterally. This is the unilateral executive theory. However, the unilateral executive portends more
than action. In reality, the unilateral executive theory provides an opportunity to implement a unilateral agenda. Thus, the aim of this paper is to
consider executive power, the separation of powers, and the unilateral executive theory to determine if presidential power under the separation of
powers doctrine is actually “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” With regard to
this, we will consider the intentions of the framers, the text of the Constitution, and the mandates of governmental necessity.
The executive, legislature, and judiciary represent the three fundamental branches of government. Yet the Constitution does not expressly delineate a separation of powers doctrine. In fact, the Constitution contains
no provisions explicitly declaring that the powers of the three branches of
the federal government shall be separated. Indeed, to some degree separation of powers is a misnomer. Professor Richard Neustadt observed that
“[t]he Constitutional Convention of 1787 is supposed to have created a
government of ‘separate powers.’ It did nothing of the sort. Rather, it

* The author is an Attorney and an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Southern New England
School of Law. The author graduated as Valedictorian of the Southern New England School of Law in
2007. The author wishes to thank Professors Miriam Miquelon-Wiesmann, Frances Rudko, Kevin
Connelly, Nozar Alaolmolki, and Judge Francis Larkin for their support and Professors John Koritansky and Harvey Mansfield for their influential scholarship.
1. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 66 (1950).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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created a government of separated institutions sharing powers.”3 Principal
among such powers are those executive in nature.
As such, it is important to survey executive power. This survey will
begin with a select review of Alexander Hamilton’s contributions to The
Federalist. This includes consideration of the various executive powers
under the U.S. Constitution. As Hamilton observed, in order to ensure
good government it is necessary to ensure an independent and energetic
execution. Given this, the preconditions necessary to maintain an energetic
executive will be examined. Further, the competing notions of executive
power espoused by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton will be explored. These notions illustrate visions of executive power that are weak
and strong, respectively. Finally, we must consider the leading interpretation of executive power by the U.S. Supreme Court. In critiquing this interpretation, several conceptual problems will be identified and explored.
Next, in order to gauge the propriety of the unilateral executive theory,
a review will be made of the separation of powers doctrine. In surveying
this doctrine, the roots of separation of powers theory will be considered
together with James Madison’s contributions to The Federalist. This reveals a system that is almost wholly reliant on competition among government branches to employ the various checks and balances, which in turn
prevent the consolidation of government power. In interpreting this doctrine, two strains have emerged in the Court’s jurisprudence. These strains,
respectively, are firmly rooted in “formalism” and “functionalism.”. However, a close examination reveals that each approach is flawed. While each
approach has distinct shortcomings, the fatal flaw in each is the failure to
take into account the impact of political parties on the separation of powers. Broadly speaking, the biggest problem with the Court’s separation of
powers jurisprudence is that it does not represent a distinct separation of
powers law, and it does not take into account the role of political parties in
unifying government.
Having briefly reviewed executive power and the separation of powers
doctrine, the primary focus will switch to the unilateral executive theory
and its sources of support. More specifically, five sources of support are
identified. The five sources include: (1) the unitary nature of the executive
office; (2) implied executive powers under the Constitution; (3) executive
tools such as signing statements, executive orders, and executive agreements; (4) supportive legislation; and (5) the marginalization of the legislative and judicial branches of government. A review of these sources suggests that political parties, in marginalizing the legislative and judicial
3. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL
OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN

POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS
29 (1990).
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branches, can magnify the power of the four remaining sources. Notably,
without this magnification it appears that the four remaining sources would
be consistent with the Constitution. Indeed, there is substantial evidence
indicating that the framers intended unilateral executive action.4 More
importantly, such action may represent a constitutional necessity. However, in the end the role of political parties and the magnification of the
remaining sources may impermissibly tip the balance of power among our
three branches of government.
The degree to which unilateral executive action and agenda are acceptable must be determined relative to both the text of our Constitution and
the mandates of necessity. But what powers are encapsulated by the text of
the Constitution and who is to interpret this text? Also, what are the mandates of necessity? It is of course necessary to acknowledge and explore
these questions in addressing the propriety of the unilateral executive theory. Finally, in conclusion, the genealogy of modern executive power will
be considered relative to the unilateral executive theory and the perhaps
veiled character of the executive office.
II. EXECUTIVE POWER
In order to understand the unilateral executive phenomenon, it is first
necessary to understand executive power in the United States. The contributions of Alexander Hamilton to The Federalist are particularly helpful in
developing such an understanding. By way of background, Hamilton was
the most avid contributor to The Federalist, which was written as an authoritative explanation of the proposed government and its Constitution.
The Federalist was published in New York newspapers beginning on October 27, 1787 in an effort to secure state ratification of the proposed U.S.
Constitution.5 In The Federalist, Hamilton considers each facet of the proposed executive and explains how they combine to produce the characteristics of good government. In doing so he paints the picture of an energetic
president who is vested with implied executive powers, which he can unilaterally wield.
In The Federalist No. 69, Hamilton examines “the real characters of
the proposed executive” in an attempt to gain support for a unitary executive.6 Having just recently escaped the dominion of the Crown, the Ameri4. See generally JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
47 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1920) (discussing the corollaries of establishing a unitary executive).
5. Charles R. Kesler, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at ix–x (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic 2003) (1961).
6. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 414.
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can colonists were of course weary of centralized power. Therefore, Hamilton’s examination of the executive was a crucial task in helping to defuse
their concerns and secure ratification of the Constitution. In other words,
Hamilton’s analysis was focused as a means limited to this end. As a result, Hamilton did not explore the murky depths of executive power in The
Federalist to as great an extent as he did in later works. A review of these
later works indicates that he did not reveal key portions of his constitutional philosophy in The Federalist.
The unitary character of the executive branch was one of the more controversial aspects of the proposed executive power.7 Many framers worried that consolidating the executive power in a single man would in effect
create “the fetus of monarchy.”8 Thus, it is not surprising that the unitary
character is the first feature of the executive that Hamilton addresses. He
notes that the most prominent feature of the executive is “that the executive
authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate.”9 He
then examines the characteristics of specific executive powers to distinguish them from the power wielded by the British King.
Unlike the British King, the president is elected for a term of four
years and as such he wields no hereditary power. Nevertheless, Hamilton
recommends that the president be “re-eligible as often as the people of the
United States shall think him worthy of their confidence.”10 In short, Hamilton believes that the president must be accountable for his actions and
that a four year term with indefinite re-eligibility will provide for increased
accountability. Hamilton argued that term limits would have five ill effects. He argued that term limits: (1) would produce a diminution of the
inducements to good behavior; (2) would encourage the tendency of using
“corrupt expedients” because only a limited time is available to achieve
presidential objectives; (3) would deprive the community of the advantage
of having a more experienced executive; (4) would banish “men from stations in which, in certain emergencies of the state, their presence might be
of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety”;11 and (5) would
“operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration . .
. [b]y necessitating a change of men, in the first office of the nation.”12
Notably, the first and second of the ill effects may be troublesome when
coupled together with unilateral executive power.
7. This is well illustrated by the contentious debates that took place on June 1, 1787 at the Constitutional Convention. See MADISON, supra note 4, at 45–47.
8. Id. at 46.
9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 6, at 414.
10. Id.
11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 437.
12. Id. at 438.
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Hamilton goes on to note that the president may also be removed while
in office through impeachment for treason, bribery or other high crimes
and misdemeanors.13 However, Article I, Section 2, Clause 6 of the Constitution stipulates that a two-thirds majority is required to impeach the
president. As will be discussed below, the two party political system and
the power of party affiliation and loyalty can significantly reduce the risk
of presidential impeachment. By virtue of this reduced risk, a political
environment is produced, which can be characterized as more hospitable to
executive hegemony.
Hamilton also notes that the president is vested with a qualified, as opposed to an absolute, veto power. He argued that this functions as a check
on both the executive and legislative branches.14 He also remarks that the
president, in his capacity as commander in chief, is limited in his control of
the armed forces to when they are “called into the actual service of the
United States.”15 This provides little consolation though, as the president
himself may call them into service. This point is well illustrated by the
numerous military “conflicts” and “interventions” that have occurred
throughout the history of the United States. Interestingly, this seems to
remain true despite the enactment of the 1973 War Powers Resolution,
which sought to limit the power of the president to wage war without the
approval of Congress. This is not surprising given Hamilton’s assurance
that “[t]he direction of war implies the direction of the common strength;
and the power of directing and employing the common strength, forms a
usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.”16 In
fact, Hamilton finds that “[o]f all the cares or concerns of government, the
direction of war most peculiarly demands . . . the exercise of power by a
single hand.”17
He also notes that the president has the substantial ability to grant reprieves and pardons.18 However, he observed that this power is not extended to cover cases of impeachment. Yet it seems clear that this limited
restriction is only meaningful if the impeachment process has real teeth. If
history is any indication, presidential impeachment has been somewhat of
a paper tiger. It appears likely that political parties may have played a primary role in de-clawing this tiger.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 6, at 414.
Id. at 415.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 446.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 6, at 415.
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In addition, Hamilton observed that the president can recommend
measures to Congress that he believes are necessary and expedient.19 At
first glance, this may seem like a nominal power. To the contrary, in the
presence of powerful party allegiances, this is actually a quite significant
power. In fact, this ability can actually serve as a vehicle with which to
unilaterally advance an executive agenda. For instance, if the president
and a majority in Congress are unified through party affiliation and the
president recommends a measure, generally speaking, that measure will
receive additional support simply by virtue of his party affiliation. Therefore, the president can exercise his power to introduce measures and can
rely to some degree on party affiliation to, in effect, unilaterally advance
his agenda through the legislature.
It is also important to observe that in listing executive powers, Hamilton seemingly classifies the provision to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” as a power.20 This is very significant, as will be discussed
below, because it seems to infer that the president has a somewhat openended source of implied power. In fact, this clause has been interpreted
quite broadly in recent years. Further, the president has broad appointment
powers and the power to commission all officers of the United States.21 In
addition, the president has exclusive removal power over officials performing strictly executive functions.22 The power to remove is the power to
control. These powers help to secure loyalty among commissioned officers and appointees, which in turn increases his chances of successfully
implementing a unilateral agenda. Finally, Hamilton observed that the
president is vested with the power to receive ambassadors and other public
ministers and the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Surely, these powers provide the opportunity to substantially influence U.S. foreign policy. The sum of his powers in this area provides
the president the means with which to independently advance his agenda
on a global scale.
The powers described thus far provide the impetus for energetic execution. In The Federalist No. 70, Hamilton confirms that “[e]nergy in the
executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.”23
Hamilton finds that energy in the executive “is essential to the protection
of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the
19. Id.
20. Id. at 416.
21. Id. at 416, 419.
22. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (finding that the president has exclusive
removal power over all executive officials); cf. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629
(1935) (limiting the president’s exclusive removal power to officials performing strictly executive as
opposed to quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions).
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 421.
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steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property . . . [and] to
the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of
faction, and of anarchy.”24 On the other hand, Hamilton deplores a feeble
executive as this implies feeble execution.25 With regard to this it is helpful to consider Professor John Koritansky’s insights on Hamilton’s philosophy of government and administration.
From the point of view of this interpretation we can read with an
enlightened eye what Hamilton says in Federalist No. 68 about his
degree of agreement with Alexander Pope’s famous statement that,
“For forms of government let fools contest—That which is best
administered is best.” It is true that Hamilton brands Pope’s
statement a “political heresy” but we should note how careful he is
to state his disagreement in a way that reveals a considerable
agreement. Without breaking sentences Hamilton follows Pope’s
heretical statement by saying, “. . . yet we may safely pronounce
that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency
to produce a good administration.” In contrast to Pope’s statement, forms of government are important, but they are only so in
so far as they tend to promote good administration, Hamilton’s response to Pope is very clever; for while he does charge Pope with
heresy, he misses the point of that heresy—or rather, he actually
endorses it! Surely the scandalous or heretical element in what
Pope says is the suggestion that it does not matter what ends or
purposes a government owns; so long as whatever it does it does
effectively and efficiently, and takes care of themselves. And
Hamilton appears to agree. Pope had been careless—he had perhaps misused a bit of poetic license—in saying that “forms” are
absolutely unimportant. Forms, in truth, have a secondary importance as they tend to foster or hinder good administration. But the
point remains that the relatively pedestrian standards of administration as such, effectiveness and efficiency, are the standards of
government as a whole. It is this consideration that recommends
the most important part of the formal structure of the government
Hamilton is helping to establish, namely the unitary character of
the executive.26
Overall, Hamilton identifies four ingredients necessary for an energetic
executive. These four ingredients are unity, duration, adequate provisions
24. Id. at 421–22.
25. Id. at 422.
26. John Koritansky, Alexander Hamilton’s Philosophy of Government and Administration,
PUBLIUS, Spring 1979, at 99, 112–13.
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for support, and competent powers.27 With regard to unity, Hamilton states
that “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize
the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.”28 In short, he finds that a unitary executive will be more efficient and easier to hold accountable for his
mistakes.29 Accordingly, he finds that unity can be destroyed “in two
ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority, or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole
or in part, to the control and cooperation of others, in the capacity of counselors to him.”30 With regard to duration, as discussed above, Hamilton
believes that there is a need for indefinite re-eligibility. Adequate provisions for support are also necessary. This involves financially insulating
the president from Congress as otherwise “[t]hey might, in most cases,
either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by largesses, to surrender at
discretion his judgment to their inclinations.”31 Finally, in terms of competent powers Hamilton reviews the veto, military, treaty-making, and appointing powers of the executive, which “combines, as far as republican
principles will admit, all the requisites to [executive] energy.”32
Ultimately, two competing notions of executive power have developed. One view, the “strong executive theory,” finds that a president may
do anything not specifically prohibited by the Constitution. The other
view, “the weak executive theory,” finds that a president may only exercise
powers that are expressly enumerated to him by the Constitution or delegated to him by Congress under one of its enumerated powers. Professor
Harvey Mansfield describes the two notions of executive power as “a weak
executive resulting from the notion that the people are represented in the
legislature, [and] a strong executive from the notion that they are embodied
in the executive.”33
Interestingly, in terms of a constitutional executive, these two notions
can be traced back to Madison and Hamilton, respectively. While Hamilton and Madison each made substantial contributions to The Federalist
they did not share similar views on executive power. Upon close inspection it appears there is “tension between Hamilton and Madison in The
Federalist Papers regarding representation, and correspondingly, regarding
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 23, at 422.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 423, 426.
Id. at 423.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 439.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 462 (emphasis added).
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE
POWER 5–6 (1989).
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the issue of executive initiative versus legislative supremacy.”34 Seemingly, their goal of securing constitutional ratification behooved them to
avoid a confrontation on the issue in The Federalist. Still, a confrontation
regarding executive power was on the horizon.
Following ratification of the Constitution, in 1793 President George
Washington declared by executive proclamation that America was “neutral
in the war between Britain and France.”35 Following Washington’s proclamation, Madison and Hamilton engaged in a famous debate on executive
power. In support of the strong executive view, Hamilton defended the
proclamation under the assumed name of “Pacificus.”36 On the other hand,
in support of the weak executive view, Madison attacked the proclamation
under the assumed name of “Helvidius.”37
While Hamilton’s passages in The Federalist might seem to indicate
otherwise, he was a firm subscriber to the strong executive view. As Professor Koritansky notes, “[w]hen Hamilton writes about the executive in
the Federalist he has to respond to the fear among his readers of executive
tyranny, and so he veils the most expansive possible interpretation of the
executive’s constitutional powers.”38 To the contrary, as Pacificus, “his
purpose is to announce and vindicate the more expansive interpretation.”39
Essentially, Hamilton argued, “executive power, unlike legislative power,
is more than the sum of its parts” and therefore “executive power, in the
singular, can be illustrated, but it cannot be enumerated because it cannot
be exhausted.”40 Further, Hamilton argued that the president has the power
to judge for himself the meaning of law with regard to his execution thereof.41 This interpretation clearly paints a picture in which the executive
emerges not as a coequal branch of government, but rather as the ultimate
sovereign entity in the United States. Establishing the president as the
sovereign is not surprising if the preservation of the United States is the
ultimate province of the executive as Hamilton maintains.
Conversely, as Helividius, Madison denied the executive any discretion as to foreign affairs or interpreting the law.42 In stark contrast to Hamilton, Madison believed that the president’s only responsibility is to faithfully execute the laws—seemingly with a blind eye toward the resulting

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Koritansky, supra note 26, at 114.
MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at 275.
Id. at 276.
Id.
Koritansky, supra note 26, at 115 (emphasis added).
Id.
MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at 276 (emphasis added).
Id. at 277.
Id. at 278.
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consequences.43 In light of such notions, the efficacy of Madison’s approach appears to be questionable at best. Surely the enumerated executive
powers serve as an illustration that the president was not intended to be
wholly and blindly subservient to the legislature. Still, Madison’s approach paints a picture in which the legislature is the ultimate sovereign
entity in the United States. As a practical matter, this poses several problems. Most importantly, for reasons described above by Hamilton, this is
antithetical to an energetic administration. This, in turn, reduces sovereign
efficiency and security; in a time of national emergency these problems
could very well be fatal. Again, “the true test of a good government is its
aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.”44 If history is
any indication, legislative governance fails this test miserably. It follows
that “[c]ontemporary political scientists generally concede, some reluctantly and some with enthusiasm, that Congress cannot govern and that
only the president can.”45
The struggle between the strong and weak executive theories continues
to this day. The longevity of this controversy is not surprising though because neither The Federalist nor the Constitution contains an exhaustive
list of executive powers; neither expressly defines executive power per se.
Mansfield observed that “[t]he lack of an official definition allows each
president to become responsible for creating his own” definition of executive power.46 This explains the historical fluctuations between strong and
weak presidents. Notably, the strong view has been adopted by many of
our greatest presidents, including Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt argued that the president could “do anything that the needs
of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution.”47
In light of the ambiguity surrounding executive power, the Court has
had no easy task in identifying its parameters. Not surprisingly, the Court
has struggled at completing this task. This is well exemplified by the tripartite analysis of Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, otherwise known as The Steel Seizure Case.48 In this case, the
Court was faced with the task of deciding whether President Truman was
“acting within his constitutional power when he issued [Executive Order
10340] directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and op-

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 413.
Koritansky, supra note 26, at 121.
MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at 278.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 389 (1913).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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erate most of the Nation’s steel mills.”49 At the time, a dispute had arisen
between the steel companies and their employees, which prompted the
Steelworkers’ Union to give notice of a nation-wide strike.50 The president
feared that such a strike would result in a stoppage of steel production at
the height of the Korean War. Clearly this posed a threat to our national
security. As such, President Truman argued that seizure of the steel mills
was necessary to avoid a national catastrophe and was authorized by the
aggregate of his constitutional powers as the nation’s chief executive and
the commander in chief of the armed forces.51 The Court did not agree and
held that the seizure order was unconstitutional.52
Nevertheless, Justice Jackson concurred in this decision and in doing
so he formulated a tripartite analysis to identify the contours of executive
power. His approach has been frequently referenced and heralded as “the
most celebrated judicial opinion of the separation of powers canon.”53 The
approach involves cataloging executive action into one of three distinct
groups. The first group includes presidential action that is pursuant to
congressional authority. Justice Jackson argued that in this group presidential power is at its apex.54 The second group includes presidential action in the context of congressional silence. Justice Jackson refers to this
group as “a zone of twilight” in which the president “can only rely upon
his own independent powers.”55 The third group includes presidential actions that are incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.
Here Justice Jackson finds that the president “can rely only upon his own
Constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over
the matter.”56
Troublingly, Justice Jackson’s tripartite approach seems to indicate an
executive subservience to the legislature. Because Congress creates laws
and the president is entrusted with their execution does not necessarily
mean that he is subservient to the legislature. Stating that presidential
power is at its apex when pursuant to congressional authority implies that
the president acts with less strength in exercising his independent powers.
This suggests an executive subservience to the legislature. The third group
places the president in a similar position by defining executive power as
being residual in nature when in conflict with congressional sentiment.
49. Id. at 582.
50. Id. at 582–83.
51. Id. at 582.
52. Id. at 589.
53. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2311, 2314 (2006).
54. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 637.
56. Id.
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This also limits executive independence. Hamilton finds that executive
dependence on the legislative body violates “fundamental principles of
good government.”57 To be sure, the president is responsible for taking
care that the laws are faithfully executed. Still, this does not fully encapsulate his duties or intended function. Indeed, the presidential oath tellingly
states, “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”58 This
oath confirms that the province of the president is not simply to execute
laws but more accurately it is to execute the office and to defend the Constitution. This is consistent with Hamilton’s notion that the preservation of
the Union must ultimately be the province of the executive.
Overall, Justice Jackson’s approach seems somewhat inconsistent with
this notion and in practice can alter the nature of the executive office. In
other words, Justice Jackson’s analysis may reduce the president to a mere
messenger boy for Congress. This could have dangerous consequences in
the face of exigent circumstances. As Justice Vinson observed “[u]nder
this messenger-boy concept of the Office, the President cannot even act to
preserve legislative programs from destruction so that Congress will have
something left to act upon.”59 In short, Justice Jackson’s approach substantially reduces executive power and in doing so changes the character of the
office. At bottom, the president’s power is constitutionally proscribed and
“is not to be construed as deriving from Congress’ actions, but rather that it
derives from the Constitution itself, and that it can set itself into motion.”60
It follows that the discretion and executive powers vested in the president may be more expansive than is recognized by Justice Jackson’s analysis. The actual latitude of this discretion will be considered in greater detail below. Broadly speaking, the existence of expansive executive powers
is not surprising given the lofty charge of preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution. In connection with this, it is also not surprising
that the president is capable of acting unilaterally. Given the nature of his
responsibilities, this seems to be somewhat of a necessity. However, at
some point unilateral executive action can change the balance of government power. It can lead to the usurpation of power intended for coordinate
branches of government. This of course undermines the spirit behind the
separation of powers doctrine. Consequently, the question becomes how

57.
58.
59.
60.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 432.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (emphasis added).
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 708–09 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
Koritansky, supra note 26, at 117.
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much unilateral action is acceptable and who is charged with determining
the benchmark for acceptability?
III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
The separation of powers doctrine is aimed at preventing the consolidation of government power and is a hallmark of the U.S. government.
More than a hallmark though, it “is the chief of the ‘auxiliary precautions’
necessary against oppression by government . . . [and] is auxiliary [only] to
‘dependence on the people’ or to representation, the primary precaution.”61
However, separation of powers theory does not owe its genesis to our
founding fathers. In fact, the categorization and separation of government
powers was a topic discussed by many, including Enlightenment philosophers John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu.
In his Second Treatise on government, Locke grouped government
power into two distinct categories: legislative and executive.62 Locke argued that consolidation of these powers was dangerous. Specifically, he
worried that there is
too great a temptation to humane frailty apt to grasp at Power, for
the same Persons who have the Power of making Laws, to have
also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may
exempt themselves from Obedience to the Laws they make, and
suit the Law, both in its making and execution, to their own private
advantage.63
For this reason Locke argued that laws require perpetual execution by a
separate body of government.
Similarly, Montesquieu discussed the ideal separation of government
powers, which he coined as “trias politicas.”64 Specifically, Montesquieu
described a division of political power between executive, legislative, and
judicial government functions. He based this model on the British system,
in which he perceived a separation of powers between the King, Parliament, and the judiciary. Ultimately, he believed that political liberty could
be found only when there is no abuse of power.65 He stated: “But constant
experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it,
61. HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 115 (1991).
62. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: SECOND TREATISE § 143, reprinted in 1 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at ch. 10, doc. 3 (Peter Laslett ed., 1965), available at http://press-pubs.
uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch10s3.html.
63. Id. § 144.
64. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Prometheus Books 2002) (1900).
65. Id. at 150.
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and to carry his authority as far as it will go.”66 To prevent such abuse,
Montesquieu firmly believed that “power should be a check to power.”67
In other words, he believed that government must divide power to prevent
its abuse.
The force of Montesquieu’s analysis is reflected in the debates at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787. For instance, on July 17, 1787, James
Madison remarked that “[i]f it be essential to the preservation of liberty
that the Legisl; Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each
other.”68 Citing Montesquieu, Madison explains that such a separation is
necessary, otherwise “tyrannical laws may be made and may be executed
in a tyrannical manner.”69 For this reason, Madison strongly urged that a
system of checks be designed to balance and harmonize power among separate branches of government.70
The need for a separation of powers was further examined in The Federalist. Because men are not angels, Madison argued in The Federalist No.
51 that “[i]n framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men . . . you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”71 Madison further
argued that in order to achieve such stability, in the structure of government, “ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”72 In light of
American federalism, this means counteracting ambition in both the federal
and state levels of government.73 In other words, America requires a separation of powers between distinct levels of government and a separation of
powers within each level of government. Overall, Madison believed that
the ideal government must be structured to furnish proper checks and balances between executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.74 He believed this could be achieved only by giving to those who
administer each such branch “the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the other [branches].”75
Notably, in his original draft of what would become the Bill of Rights,
Madison included a proposed amendment that would make the separation

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
MADISON, supra note 4, at 311.
Id.
Id. at 312–13.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 319 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 318–19.
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of powers explicit.76 More specifically, Madison proposed as his sixteenth
amendment that:
The powers delegated by the Constitution to the government of
the United States, shall be exercised as therein appropriated, so
that the Legislative shall never exercise the powers vested in the
Executive or Judicial; nor the Executive the powers vested in the
Legislative or Judicial; nor the Judicial the powers vested in the
Legislative or Executive.77
However, his proposal was rejected because his fellow congressmen believed the separation of powers was implicit in the Constitution.78 In other
words, they believed the substance of the amendment was already provided
for in the text of the Constitution itself. As such, the separation of powers
doctrine is not expressly delineated anywhere in the Constitution.
Still, the structure of the Constitution reflects the intent to create three
separate branches of government, and it addresses these three branches in
turn. Notably, the legislature is the first branch of government addressed
in the Constitution. In fact, the first sentence of Article I states: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” The
first sentence of Article II states that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America.” Importantly, this language
renders the executive branch the only branch of the federal government to
rest its power in an individual as opposed to an institution. Finally, the
judiciary is addressed in the first sentence of Article III, which states: “The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.” The prominent placement of these sentences and the fact
that each article is dedicated to a separate branch of government underscores the vital importance that separation of powers played in the minds
of the framers.
The fact that the legislature is addressed in the first article is not surprising given Madison’s insistence that “[i]n republican government the
legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.”79 Madison believed that
76. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MONDAY, 24TH
AUGUST, 1789, at 3 (New York, Greenleaf 1789), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
D?rbpebib:3:./temp/~ammem_OEj4.
77. Id.
78. Exploring Constitutional Conflicts: Separation of Powers, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/
projects/ftrials/conlaw/separationofpowers.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2007).
79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 71, at 319. The issue of legislative versus executive supremacy would later become a focal point for the development of great tension between Hamilton and
Madison. This will be discussed in greater detail below.
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dividing the legislature into two competing branches would help to limit
legislative supremacy.80 Apart from internal constraints, Madison also
believed that it was necessary to prevent any one branch from dominating
the others and “to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further
precautions.”81 Yet, as Alexander Hamilton notes, “the insufficiency of a
mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each [branch is clear]; . . .
and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own
defense, has been inferred and proved.”82 However, this presupposes a
system where there is competition among government branches, which
compels the use of their defenses.
Still, many structural safeguards were implemented to assist in achieving this goal. For instance, broadly speaking, congressional authority to
enact laws can be checked by an executive veto, or by a judicial determination that a law is unconstitutional. Similarly, executive action might be
checked congressionally through budget control and impeachment, and
judicially through a determination that an executive act is unconstitutional.
Finally, the judiciary may be checked through executive nominations and
congressionally through the confirmation and impeachment processes. Of
course these examples represent only a few of the many structural safeguards that characterize and shape our understanding of the amorphous
separation of powers doctrine.
Professor E. Donald Elliott observed that because there is no express
constitutional explication of the separation of powers doctrine, “the ‘text’
in separation of powers law is everything that the Framers did and said in
making the original Constitution plus the history of our government since
the founding.”83 As a result, the judiciary has had no easy task in outlining
the contours of this doctrine and trying to enforce its underlying principles.
This difficult task is further complicated by the need to address political
parties and their ability to undermine the separation of powers doctrine.
Not surprisingly, given its propensity for unilateral action, many of the
most difficult separation of powers issues involve the executive branch.
In considering the separation of powers doctrine, it is clear that two
competing approaches have emerged in the Court’s jurisprudence—the
“formal” and “functional” approaches. The formalist approach is characterized by a rigid interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine.84
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 31, at 441 (emphasis added).
83. E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 506, 508 (1989).
84. This approach was utilized by the Court in many cases. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v.
Citizens for Abatement of Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991) (finding a separation of powers violation in
creating a Board of Review composed of nine members of Congress that was given authority to veto
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This seems to be the predominant approach in the Court’s jurisprudence.85
Under this approach the Court views the legislative, executive, and judicial
vesting clauses as not only a grant of specific powers but also as a limitation on each branch of government. In other words, the formalist approach
interprets the vesting clauses of the Constitution as affirmative grants of
power and power-restricting boundaries. Through its rigid interpretation,
this approach sacrifices government flexibility at the altar of alleged textual formalism.
The formalist approach places great emphasis on maintaining exclusivity of legislative, executive, and judicial power. This approach seems to
overlook the fact that “[v]irtually every part of the government Congress
has created—the Department of Agriculture as well as the Securities and
Exchange Commission—exercises all three of the governmental functions
the Constitution so carefully allocates among Congress, President, and
Court.”86 More importantly, it is necessary to share power to check power.
In fact, the various checks and balances structured into the Constitution
serve as a reminder that our system, while divided into separate branches,
anticipates that power will be shared. As Justice Jackson has noted,
“[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.”87 Inasmuch as formalist rigidity can prevent this from
happening, formalism loses track of the Constitution’s predominant purpose.
Contrary to the formalist approach, the Court has also adopted a functionalist approach, which places less emphasis on rigidity and more emphasis on pragmatism and governmental flexibility.88 This approach “perceived overlapping areas of competence rather than strict boundaries, an
evolutionary rather than textual and historical approach, and the use of
balancing tests to determine whether new arrangements could be accommodated.”89 While this approach provides for greater flexibility, it does so
decision of an agency exercising executive power); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 728–29 (1986)
(holding that separation of powers was violated by maintaining removal power over an executive
officer by Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953–54 (1983) (holding that Congress may not
promulgate a statute granting to itself a legislative veto over actions of the executive branch consistent
with separation of powers principles).
85. This is underscored by the fact that after trying the competing approach the Court ultimately
reverted back to the formalist approach in Airports Authority, 501 U.S. at 255.
86. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORN. L. REV. 488, 492 (1987) (emphasis in original).
87. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 579 (1952) (Stewart, J., concurring).
88. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 684, 692 (1988) (upholding law which limited the president’s
executive power by placing a “good cause” requirement on the president’s ability to remove an independent counsel).
89. NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 273–74 (3d ed. 2005).
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at the expense of establishing clear boundaries. The functionalist approach
eschews such boundaries in favor of ad hoc judicial determinations and
discretion. Unfortunately, this provides very little guidance as to the constitutional contours of the separation of powers, and ultimately, this approach places the doctrine at great risk of being distorted by the everchanging tides of judicial sentiment.
On the one hand, the formalist approach has the benefit of drawing
clear-cut boundaries. Regretfully, these boundaries seem to focus only on
the respective vesting clauses as opposed to the intended goal of providing
“the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the other [branches].”90 On the other hand, the functionalist approach does have the flexibility necessary to achieve this goal. Unfortunately, however, the functionalist approach offers almost no clear
boundaries. Further, inasmuch as this is the case, the functionalist approach renders the separation of powers highly susceptible to manipulation. Most importantly, however, both approaches fail to take into account
the impact of political parties on the separation of powers. Overall, the
Court confirms that “the greatest security against tyranny—the accumulation of excessive authority in a single Branch—lies not in a hermetic division among the Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked and
balanced power within each Branch.”91 Yet, for the aforementioned reasons, both the formalist and functionalist approaches fail to adequately
safeguard this security.
Given this, it is not surprising that constitutional theorists, such as Professor Elliott, describe our separation of powers jurisprudence as simply
“abysmal.”92 Elliott states that our separation of powers jurisprudence is
abysmal “because the Supreme Court has failed for over two hundred years
of our history to develop a law of separation of powers.”93 Rather than
create a separation of powers law, the Court has merely “reached a collection of results in separation of powers cases” and in so doing has undeniably failed to develop “a body of principle and theory that is coherent and
useful in enabling the system ‘to be wiser than the individuals who constitute it.’”94 As a result, Elliott finds that “our separation of powers law is
now dumber than the individuals who make it, as if there were some virtue

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 71, at 318–19.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989).
Elliott, supra note 83, at 506.
Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 113, 145 (1984)).
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in judges blinding themselves to the practical consequences of their decisions about governmental structure.”95
The failure to take into account the impact of political parties and the
failure to create a clearly defined and functional separation of powers law
has had many unfortunate consequences. Most troubling is the seeming
inability of the Court to prevent disproportionate concentrations of government power from gradually developing over time. This is particularly
troublesome if we give credence to Lord Acton’s warning that “[p]ower
tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”96 To be sure,
James Madison saw the concentration of government power as the root of
tyranny. Madison states in The Federalist No. 47 that the “accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”97 Nowhere is
the risk of consolidation more pronounced than in the executive branch,
which is unitary by its very nature. After all, Article II vests all executive
power in “a President of the United States of America.”98 At bottom, of
the many problems with the Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence,
perhaps the most notable is its reluctance to confront the unilateral executive phenomenon.
IV. THE UNILATERAL EXECUTIVE
In simplest terms, the unilateral executive can be understood to mean
an executive acting unilaterally. However, to truly understand this phenomenon one must dig deeper. The true hallmark of the unilateral executive is not executive action per se. Rather, the heart of the unilateral executive phenomenon lies in the pursuit of a unilateral executive agenda,
and the unilateral determination of the means with which to achieve this
agenda. This in turn requires a consolidation of power in the executive.
In tracing the consolidation of power in the executive, it is important to
first observe that there is a consolidation of power in the federal government. The Supremacy Clause establishes the Constitution, federal statutes,
and U.S. treaties as “the supreme Law of the Land.”99 In short, this ensures that federal law will trump state law. A fair inference from this is
95. Id. at 507.
96. Phrases.org – Phrase Finder, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/288200.html (last visited Dec.
04, 2007). This phrase was coined by Lord Acton in a letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton in 1887. Id.
97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 298.
98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
99. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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that the federal agenda and policies, which are encapsulated by law, will
overshadow conflicting state policies. Moreover, in McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall found expansive federal power in the Necessary and Proper Clause. This clause gives to Congress the power to “make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”100 In McCulloch, Marshall notes that the Constitution includes both
express and implied powers. He interprets “necessary and proper” to mean
“convenient” and “useful” and finds that by virtue of this, “[u]nless a specific means be expressly prohibited to the general government, it has it,
within the sphere of its specified powers.”101 Given this, it appears that not
much is left of state residual sovereignty.102 At bottom, it appears that true
power is consolidated in the federal government—the federal government
is the sovereign. The president is the focal point of that sovereign.
Having established this, we must now explore the means by which
power might be consolidated in the president. We must explore the
sources of unilateral executive action. There are five primary support
sources for such action. The first source is the unitary nature of the executive office. The second source of support comes from an affirmative finding and expansive interpretation of implied executive powers under the
Constitution. This involves expansive interpretations of the take care,
commander in chief, and foreign policy powers. The third source of support comes from executive tools, including among others, executive orders,
executive agreements, and executive signing statements. The fourth source
of support is the marginalization of the legislative and judicial branches.
This includes the use of jurisdiction stripping, the impact of political parties, and a resurgence of the politics of fear. The final source of support
comes from related legislation such as the Patriot Act, Military Commission Act, and Detainee Treatment Act.
As discussed above, the Constitution stipulates that “[t]he executive
Power shall be vested in a President.”103 This confirms the consolidation
of all executive power in the president. This also confirms the unitary
character of executive power under the Constitution. The unitary character
in turn assists the president in his ability to act unilaterally. Put differently,
100. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
101. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. X (The Tenth Amendment states “powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”). However, this provides little protection if provisions such as the Necessary and Proper
Clause are interpreted as implied powers with a seemingly open-ended scope.
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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the vesting of executive power in a single individual enables that individual to act independently and with greater speed in wielding that power.
These are key characteristics of the unilateral executive theory.
The president also derives substantial authority from his implied constitutional powers. This is an important component of the aforementioned
strong executive approach. Proponents of this approach argue that the
vesting clause of Article II operates as a grant of all powers executive in
nature.104 In other words, they believe that contrary to Article I, which
limits legislative powers to those “herein granted,” the vesting clause of
Article II gives the president power beyond those specifically enumerated.
In keeping with this theory, Article II does not expressly limit executive
power to those herein granted. Aside from this theory, many argue that the
president is vested with broad implied powers. Principal among such powers are his abilities to direct foreign policy, serve as commander in chief of
the armed forces, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Through various constitutional provisions and by virtue of his role as a
figurehead for the U.S. government, the president has the opportunity to
create, initiate, and change foreign policy. There are six principal avenues
with which to do this. These six avenues include responses to foreign
events, proposals for legislation, negotiation of international agreements,
policy statements, policy implementation, and independent action.105 Of
the six, only proposals for legislation do not provide the opportunity for
direct unilateral action. The remaining five allow for direct unilateral action and the establishment of a unilateral agenda. Further, “[a]s spokesman
and head of the foreign service, the armed forces, the intelligence services,
and the bureaucracy, the President usually responds to such events and thus
initiates U.S. policy.”106 Further still, “[t]he President as the chief spokesman of the Nation, directs Government officials and machinery in the daily
conduct of diplomacy, and has the principal responsibility for taking action
to advance U.S. foreign policy interests.”107 While Congress is capable of
exercising some influence over foreign policy, because the president initiates and is responsible for taking action to advance U.S. foreign policy,
“the lion’s share . . . [falls] to the President.”108
There may also be implied powers vested in the president by virtue of
his role as the commander in chief of the armed forces. Professor Julian
104. See Julian G. Ku, Is There an Exclusive Commander-in-Chief Power?, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 84 (2006).
105. Richard F. Grimmett, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress, CONG. RES. SERVICE
REPS., June 1, 1999, available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/6172.htm.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS: 1787-1957, at 171 (4th rev. ed.
1957).
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Ku argued that the president “does possess an exclusive Commander-inChief power that authorizes him to refuse to execute laws and treaties that
impermissibly encroach upon his inherent constitutional power.”109 Ku
explains that because the president is already vested with a general executive power, which includes the power to be chief of the armed forces, the
“most sensible textual inference” is that the Commander-in-Chief Clause
operates “as a constitutional constraint on the other two federal branches,
especially Congress, from interfering with the President’s command.”110
This interpretation provides the president with the power to act unilaterally
even in the face of opposing laws or treaties. This also seems to place the
legislature in a position of subservience to the president. Notwithstanding,
Ku argued “[t]he existence of this exclusive power is supported by the text
of the Constitution as well as judicial precedent and the practice of past
presidents.”111
Finally, there may also be implied powers in the constitutional mandate that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”112 This is confirmed by Madison’s Notes of Debates in the Federal
Convention of 1787. In his notes from June 1, 1787, Madison records a
debate on “the extent of the Executive authority.”113 During this debate
Charles Pinckney, a South Carolina representative to the convention,
moved to strike out a constitutional provision conferring power on the executive to “execute such other powers not Legislative nor Judiciary in their
nature.”114 In doing so, Pinckney explained that this language was “unnecessary” because the object of this language was already included “in the
‘power to carry into effect the national laws.’”115 Tellingly, a vote was
taken and because a majority agreed with Pinckney the words were in fact
struck out.116 Overall, the Supreme Court has found that by virtue of the
Take Care Clause the president has the implied power to act without statutory authorization to enforce laws or protect federal rights.117 This of
course provides an alternate justification for the exercise of unilateral executive action.
In addition to implied or inherent powers, the president has various executive tools, which can employ unilateral action in furtherance of a unilat109. Ku, supra note 104, at 84.
110. Id. at 85.
111. Id.
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
113. MADISON, supra note 4, at 47.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 48.
117. See Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1890) (finding that there is an inherent power to
protect resting by necessity in the executive).
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eral agenda. This is particularly true with regard to executive agreements,
executive orders, and executive signing statements. Executive agreements
are agreements made between the executive branch of the U.S. government
and a foreign government. Unlike treaties, the president makes these
agreements without the ratification of the Senate. In United States v. Belmont,118 the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of executive agreements
and held that they took precedence over conflicting state policy.119 Similarly, in United States v. Pink,120 the Court states that executive agreements
“have a similar dignity” as treaties, and seemingly indicates that executive
agreements might be on par with treaties.121 If this is true it means that
executive agreements could be capable of overriding both state and federal
law.122 In short, because executive agreements are given substantial weight
and because the Senate does not confirm executive agreements, they provide the president with a powerful means of advancing a unilateral foreign
policy agenda.
Executive orders also represent very powerful tools. An executive order is a decree issued pursuant to executive authority, which can have the
force of law. Such orders can put forth commands to cabinet officers, “establish governmental bureaus, modify rules, change procedures, and enforce existing statutes.”123 Despite their utility and longstanding use, critics have attacked executive orders. They charge that many presidents have
usurped the legislative power of Congress by issuing orders having the
force of law while abandoning “any pretense of tying the executive order
power to existing law.”124 They argue that “[b]ecause law, in essence, can
be made at will, and sometimes in secret, [through executive orders] both
Congress and the public are excluded from the entire legislative process.”125 While legislative usurpation is surely a legitimate concern this
argument misses the mark. The legitimacy of executive orders qua executive orders is not wholly dependent on an affirmative legislative mandate.
Rather, the president is vested with independent powers, which he may
exercise through the use of executive orders. As a matter of fact, these

118. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
119. Id. at 331–32.
120. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
121. Id. at 230.
122. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194–95 (1888) (finding that when there is a conflict
between a treaty and a federal statute the court will try give effect to both, but if that is not possible, the
last in time will prevail). Therefore, if executive agreements are tantamount to treaties they can override federal law, which contradicts and precedes them.
123. JAMES L. HIRSEN, GOVERNMENT BY DECREE: FROM PRESIDENT TO DICTATOR THROUGH
EXECUTIVE ORDERS 6 (1999).
124. Id. at 8.
125. Id. at 14.
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orders can be issued without congressional approval and can greatly assist
the president in acting unilaterally.
Another executive tool that has become a major point of contention is
signing statements. A signing statement is a written pronouncement issued
by the president of the United States upon signing a bill into law. They
have been used as a tool to make substantive, legal, constitutional, or administrative pronouncements on the bill that is being signed. In recent
years the prevalence and controversial use of presidential signing statements has come under the microscope. The controversy surrounds the use
of signing statements to create legislative history, alter the intended interpretation of a bill, limit the execution of a bill, or to declare that a provision of a bill is flat out unconstitutional. Using signing statements in this
manner can have a significant effect on both U.S. domestic and foreign
policy. This is poignantly exemplified by a December 2005 signing statement, which asserts that the president can “bypass a statutory ban on torture.”126
In placing the recent controversy over signing statements into perspective, it is helpful to observe that, “[i]n all, Bush has challenged more than
800 laws enacted since he took office, most of which he said intruded on
his constitutional powers as president and commander in chief.”127 This is
somewhat alarming because, “[b]y contrast, all previous presidents challenged a combined total of about 600 laws.”128 Given the reinvigorated use
of signing statements, it is not surprising that “Bush has virtually abandoned his veto power, giving Congress no chance to override his judgments [and] . . . has vetoed just one bill since taking office, the fewest of
any president since the 19th century.”129
For these reasons the American Bar Association formed a task force to
consider presidential signing statements and the separation of powers doctrine. As a result of their investigation the task force found that “the issuance of presidential signing statements that claim the authority or state the
intention to disregard or decline to enforce all or part of a law the President
has signed, or to interpret such a law in a manner inconsistent with the
clear intent of Congress,” is in fact “contrary to the rule of law and our
constitutional system of separation of powers.” However, this controversial use of signing statements is not without its defenders. Proponents of
signing statements urge that “[i]f the President may properly decline to
enforce a law, at least when it unconstitutionally encroaches on his powers,
126.
A1.
127.
128.
129.

Charlie Savage, Bush Cites Authority to Bypass FEMA Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 6, 2006, at
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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then it arguably follows that he may properly announce to Congress and to
the public that he will not enforce a provision of an enactment he is signing.130 There is some force to this proposition. The logical extension of
this argument is that “a signing statement that challenges what the President determines to be an unconstitutional encroachment on his power, or
that announces the President’s unwillingness to enforce (or willingness to
litigate) such a provision, can be a valid and reasonable exercise of Presidential authority.”131
Notwithstanding, the use of signing statements is a troubling executive
tool. This is true for two reasons. First, the use of signing statements may
marginalize the legislative and judicial branches. The legislature may be
marginalized by having the meaning of laws changed, by having their laws
selectively enforced, and by losing the opportunity to overcome executive
objections through the standard veto process (a two-thirds majority vote in
Congress as provided for by Article I, Section 7, Clause 2). Also, the judiciary and the practice of judicial review may be marginalized if the Supreme Court is compelled to accept signing statements as binding interpretations of legislative or constitutional provisions. Second, the use of signing statements is troubling because it is essentially unregulated. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet been presented with the opportunity
to squarely address the limits of signing statements. For this reason, by
default, we are seemingly faced with unbridled executive discretion in their
use. Ultimately, the use of signing statements must be closely examined
and limited to ensure fidelity to the separation of powers doctrine.
It is also important to consider the role of political parties in the marginalization of the legislative and judicial branches of government. Since
our founding, “Madison’s vision of competitive branches balancing and
checking one another has dominated constitutional thought about the separation of powers through the present.”132 Madison believed that each
branch of government would compete for power and as such “[a]mbition
must be made to counteract ambition.”133 Competition between branches,
in other words, was to be the synergist for the active implementation of
checks and balances. Surely, in the absence of political parties, “it was
possible to imagine that, once elected, officeholders would not be tempted
by constituent pressures and competing ideological or policy goals to sacrifice the constitutionally assigned duties and powers of their branches—
simply because constituent pressures and divergent interests were kept to a
130. Walter Dellinger, Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum Counsel to the President, 48 ARK. L.
REV. 333, 337 (1995) (memorandum dated Nov. 3, 1993).
131. Id.
132. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 53, at 2317.
133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 71, at 319.
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minimum.”134 This of course changed with the emergence of a strong two
party political system.
Professors Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes argue, “the degree
and kind of competition between the legislative and executive branches
vary significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on whether the
House, Senate, and presidency are divided or unified by political party.”135
If competition disappears, what is left to counteract ambition? For this
reason, “[t]he practical distinction between party-divided and party-unified
government rivals in significance, and often dominates, the constitutional
distinction between the branches in predicting and explaining interbranch
political dynamics.”136 It must be observed that the dynamic switches from
competitive when political parties divide government, to cooperative when
political parties unite government.137 This results in the disappearance of
checks and balances during periods of strongly unified government. As a
result, the impact of political parties “calls into question many of the foundational assumptions of separation-of-powers law and theory.”138
Succinctly put, as a catalyst for unified government, political parties
set the stage for presidential dominance. Political parties can unify the
three branches of government by espousing a certain ideology and vision.
Meanwhile, the president is the head of his respective political party.
Therefore, if this same party also dominates other branches of government
it may be inferred that the president will wield a substantial influence over
them. As a practical matter, this may result in a consolidation of power in
the executive. A corollary of this is the marginalization of branches that
are heavily influenced by political partisanship. Parenthetically, in terms
of marginalization, “the most serious damage has been done to the legislative branch” as is reflected by “[t]he sharp decline of congressional power
and autonomy in recent years.”139
The marginalization of coordinate branches is further bolstered by the
presidents appointment powers. The president may exercise this power to
appoint government officials along party lines. This of course extends the
president’s influence even further. In keeping with this, in The Steel Seizure case, Justice Jackson noted that “[p]arty loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding than law, extend [the president’s] effective control into
branches of government other than his own and he often may win, as a
134. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 53, at 2318–19.
135. Id. at 2315.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Al Gore, Address on Martin Luther King Day (Jan. 16, 2006), in HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 16,
2006, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2006/01/16/the-full-text-of-al-gore_n_13930.html.
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political leader, what he cannot command under the Constitution.”140 This
might prove to be equally true for a presidential candidate. Indeed, some
might argue that it is more than a mere coincidence that the five Republican appointed Justices of the Supreme Court, in resolving the 2000 presidential election, voted in favor of George W. Bush while the four Democratic appointed Justices voted in favor of Al Gore.141
Political parties may also make existing executive tools much more effective. For instance, when government is strongly unified through political party affiliation, the president may have a greater chance of successfully influencing the legislative process by recommending expedient measures. In addition, his nominative and veto powers may also be reinvigorated. The president could enjoy a greater chance of having his nominations confirmed and a reduced chance of being overridden by a two-thirds
majority after exercising his veto power. Moreover, when government is
united under a single political banner, the president may receive greater
latitude in using signing statements, executive orders, and executive agreements. Similarly, he may also receive greater discretion in interpreting
executive power, which paves the way for expansive interpretations of
implied executive powers pursuant to the Take Care Clause, the Commander-in-Chief Clause, and the foreign policy provisions of the Constitution.
The magnification of executive power is alarming as it may very well
operate as a one-way ratchet. In other words, once the augmented powers
are legitimatized it may not be possible to take them away. This is particularly alarming because it seems possible that augmented executive powers
might be legitimized over time through mere tacit consent. This is in keeping with the notion that, through the Declaration of Independence, consent
is established as “the complete ground of the legitimacy of all forms of
authority.”142 What is more, in the face of a strongly unified government,
the president may enjoy a reduced risk of impeachment. In this way political parties may actually reduce the effectiveness of the principal check on
the exercise of executive power. This is true not only by reducing the
chances for successful impeachment—it is also true by reducing the risk of
potential impeachment.

140. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
141. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
142. John Koritansky, Thomas Paine: The American Radical, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 63 (Bryan-Paul Frost & Jeffery Sikkenga eds., 2003). Additionally, as Koritansky observed
“the doctrine of legitimation by consent has the consequence of obliterating distinctions among the
manner or motive from which one gives consent.” Id. at 64. Therefore, Koritansky argued “[a] consent
to someone’s authority that is extracted by threat would have to be said to be as legitimating as consent
given in a mood of cool deliberation, balancing less pressing good and evils.” Id.
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Finally, political parties may also provide the executive with new
tools. This can be achieved through supportive legislation. In the face of a
strongly unified government, Congress may create laws, which expand
executive power and potentially reduce the power of the judiciary. Under
this theory Congress operates as an executive instrument. Put differently,
party affiliation might transform the legislature from a coequal branch of
government to a mere ministerial arm of the president. For instance, the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001,143 better known as
the USA PATRIOT Act or Patriot Act, is a controversial bill that was
signed into law on October 26, 2001, which provided immense power to
the executive branch. Notably, a Republican Congress passed this act and
essentially bestowed its power on George W. Bush—a Republican president. More notably, the Patriot Act was passed with minimal debate after
only forty-five days of consideration.
Other examples of supportive legislation include the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,144 the Military Commissions Act of 2006,145 and the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2006,146 among
others. Each of these acts augments presidential power. Notably, it was
ensured that each was signed into law before the congressional elections on
November 7, 2006.147 Boldly, the Detainee Treatment Act strips the Supreme Court of habeas corpus jurisdiction over detentions at Guantánamo
Bay by placing “exclusive review” in a single federal court—the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.148 Acknowledging
the number of detainees, the limited resources of this court, and the lack of
an appeals process seems to reveal that exclusive review was established in
this one court in order to prevent detainees from having meaningful access
to the court system. Similarly, the Military Commissions Act contains
“habeas provisions,” which remove access to the courts for any alien detained by the U.S. government who is determined to be an enemy combat143. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
144. Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2742–44 (2005) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
145. Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §
948 (2006)).
146. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192
(2006).
147. The Military Commissions Act was swiftly pushed through Congress and signed into law on
October 17, 2006—just under three weeks prior to the Congressional elections.
148. Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court may have the ability to exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789).
Subsection (a) of the All Writs Act authorizes the courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”
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ant, or who is awaiting determination regarding enemy combatant status.
This could allow the U.S. government to detain aliens indefinitely without
prosecuting them in any manner. In addition, the bill limits the ability to
invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.149
The habeas provisions illustrate the controversial notion that the Ordain and Establish Clause150 and the Exceptions Clause151 provide Congress with the power to unilaterally strip federal courts of their jurisdiction.
This undermines the basic tenets of judicial review and marginalizes the
role of the judiciary in government. In Marbury v. Madison,152 Chief Justice Marshall confirmed the role of the Supreme Court as the ultimate expositors of constitutional interpretation.153 More specifically, Marshall
determined that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is [because] [t]hose who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”154
From this it appears that the Court is properly charged with determining
the constitutionality of executive action.
In his January 16, 2006 Martin Luther King Day Address to the American Constitution Society and Liberty Coalition, Al Gore stated: “In a properly functioning system, the Judicial Branch would serve as the constitutional umpire to ensure that the branches of government observed their
proper spheres of authority, observed civil liberties and adhered to the rule
of law.”155 The use of jurisdiction stripping then is tantamount to ejecting
the umpire in the middle of the game. The notion of jurisdiction stripping
is particularly troubling when used as a vehicle to further a unilateral executive agenda. As such, the practice of jurisdiction stripping seems to
represent a clear violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
In summary, a review of the five sources of support for unilateral executive action suggest that political parties may marginalize the legislative
and judicial branches and may magnify the power of the remaining four
sources. Again, in the absence of such magnification, it appears that the
power generated through the four sources would otherwise be constitutional. As was discussed above, unilateral executive action is not a constitutional anomaly. Rather, such action appears to have been intended by the
framers and in reality may represent a constitutional necessity.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 177.
Id.
Gore, supra note 139.
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V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the degree to which unilateral executive action and agenda
are acceptable must be determined relative to a number of considerations.
Important considerations include necessity, security, and consistency with
the spirit of government, which is encapsulated by the separation of powers
doctrine. However, principal among the considerations must remain the
actual text of the Constitution. But again, who is to interpret this text? If
the Constitution vests power in separate but equal branches of government,
wouldn’t each branch be responsible for interpreting its respective powers?
In Marbury, the Court establishes the basis for judicial review and answers
this question in the negative.156 Changing the answer to this question now
would fly in the face of over 200 years of jurisprudence. For this among
other reasons, the Court must define a separation of powers law, which
enables them to take a more active role in establishing boundaries on executive power—boundaries that are both clear and workable. Seemingly
in furtherance of this goal, Professor Ku recommends that “[r]ather than
deny its existence, the critics of [implied presidential power] should reframe their arguments to define reasonable limitations on the scope of . . .
[that] power.”157
More to the point though, the aim of this paper was to consider executive power, the separation of powers, and the unilateral executive theory to
determine if presidential power under the separation of powers doctrine is
actually a wolf in sheep’s clothing. From the review of executive power
and the unilateral executive theory it appears that we might answer this
question in the affirmative. However, to get a more definitive answer it is
helpful to explore the genealogy of modern executive power.
Professor Harvey Mansfield explored this topic in great detail in Taming the Prince. Having carefully traced the roots of executive power
Mansfield finds that “[t]he modern doctrine of executive power was begun,
or better to say founded, by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), with full
consciousness of his departure from tradition, sanza alcuno respetto.”158
This may seem shocking at first given the conceptual distinctions separating Machiavelli’s prince from our own president. On closer inspection,
though, our notion of executive power does appear to trace directly to Machiavelli. Indeed, “the history of Machiavellism is chiefly a process of
domestication, whereby Machiavelli’s thought was appropriated and absorbed by liberal constitutionalism so that it could be regularized and le156. See Marbury, 5 U.S. 137.
157. Ku, supra note 104, at 84–85.
158. MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at xvii. The phrase “sanza alcuno respetto” essentially means
“without any respect.”
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gitimized.”159 The byproduct of this process is a tamed prince in the form
of a constitutional executive. Thus, the constitutional executive is more
“an invention of liberalism, of Locke, Montesquieu, and the American
founders, rather than of Machiavelli and Hobbes.”160
Still, through our constitutional executive, American republicanism
“has not only republicanized English monarchy but also [it has] constitutionalized the anti-constitutional Machiavellian prince, so that the impulse
to get results, regardless of the Constitution, is incorporated into the Constitution itself, and the devices of Machiavelli are made available to the
office first held by George Washington.”161 By embracing the notion of
executive power, the framers “imported not only the strength of monarchy
but also some of the techniques of tyranny.”162 Despite this—or perhaps
because of this—throughout Taming the Prince, Mansfield reflects on the
ambivalence of modern executive power. The ambivalence of modern
executive power is rooted in temperance and functional utility. In other
words, Machiavellism has been tempered and incorporated in the Constitution to satisfy the mandates of necessity. Thus, Machiavellism has been
incorporated to ensure not only efficiency in administration but also to
ensure adequate protection for the American regime. The importance of
such protection was alluded to by the Supreme Court in Cunningham v.
Neagle, which found that there is an inherent power to protect that rests by
necessity in the executive.163 Boldly, Mansfield finds that the Constitution
“would not work without a branch whose function could be accurately
described—though you might never hear it described that way—as getting
around the constitution when necessary.”164 As Abraham Lincoln rhetorically posited, “[a]re all laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”165
Thankfully, the process of “getting around the constitution when necessary” is only applicable in the most extraordinary of situations. This is
true by virtue of the broad implied powers, which our Constitution vests in
the executive. Generally, these broad executive powers ensure that the
president does not need to get around the Constitution. The president does
not generally need to get around the Constitution, in other words, because
159. Id. at xix.
160. Id. at xviii.
161. Id. at xix.
162. Id.
163. 135 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1890).
164. MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at xix. By contrast consider Justice Rehnquist’s notion that “[t]he
laws will thus not be silent in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice.”
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 225 (1998).
165. REHNQUIST, supra note 164, at vii (citing Abraham Lincoln, Message to a Special Session of
Congress (July 4, 1861)).
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the Constitution enables him to change from sheep to wolf in order to
faithfully execute his office and “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”166 In this manner our president is empowered to
meet the mandates of necessity without destroying our constitutional foundation.
If the executive is in fact a wolf in sheep’s clothing, it appears that
Hamilton may be the one responsible for having slipped on the sheep suit.
In fact, Professor Koritansky finds that “[t]he picture of American government that emerges from reflecting on Hamilton’s thoughts is that of a
constitutional monarchy” and, therefore, “Jefferson and the republicans
knew whereof they spoke when they branded Hamilton a ‘monarchist’ and
a ‘monocrat,’ even if Hamilton never himself referred to his own thought
in those words following the respectful repudiation of the avowedly monarchical stance he had taken in the Philadelphia Convention.”167
Hamilton realized that power must be vested in one sovereign agency
and that within that agency “sovereignty must come into a single point of
focus or else what they do is in vain.”168 Notably, both John Locke and
Thomas Hobbes stress this point “although Locke had also seen more
clearly than Hobbes the need to veil the terrifying image of the monarch by
calling for a body of legislators separate from the person of the executive.”169 Professor Mansfield concludes that “everyone agrees on the necessity of a strong executive, but also agrees, it appears, on the importance
of concealing that necessity.”170
It appears that the “veil” for Hamilton’s “liberal monarch” was provided by the separation of powers doctrine.171 While Madison emphasized
the importance of this doctrine, through his carefully crafted explanation of
executive power, “it was Hamilton rather than Madison who expressed
what really held it all together.”172 While Hamilton helped to secure broad
executive powers, it is clear that his efforts did not truly secure a constitutional monarch. Wholly aside from the extent of executive power, surely a
monarchy cannot be established when each president is limited to two
166.
167.
168.
169.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
Koritansky, supra note 26, at 118.
Id. at 113–14.
Id. at 114. Koritansky finds that it is
pretty well established that Locke’s discussion of “executive prerogative,” read carefully,
reveals the e[x]tent to which his doctrine of legislative supremacy is a formal requirement
that can be dispensed with under severely extenuating circumstances; and thus legislative
supremacy can be said to veil the Hobbesian character of libertarian government when circumstances are more ordinary.
Id. at n.24.
170. MANSFIELD, supra note 33, at 2.
171. Koritansky, supra note 26, at 114.
172. Id.
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terms in office. For evidence of this one need look no further than the
precedent set by Washington, which is now mandated by the TwentySecond Amendment.173 All in all, however, “[w]e remain perhaps closer to
a constitutional monarchy than it is comfortable for a democracy to admit.”174

173. The Twenty-Second Amendment states:
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who
has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to
which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President
more than once.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
174. Koritansky, supra note 26, at 121.

